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I. INTRODUCTION 
For nearly 26 years, the United States and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran have ignored, threatened, attacked, and 
denigrated each other. Despite the arrival and departure of 
numerous heads of state on both sides, the two countries 
have been unable to bridge the chasm that opened between 
them during the Iran Hostage crisis. That defining moment 
continues to impede attempts at reconciliation more than 
two and a half decades later. The inability of the two 
countries to communicate through normal diplomatic channels 
has only hampered recent efforts to address the Iranian 
nuclear program. Serious questions have been raised by 
America and the other developed countries of the world: Why 
do the Iranians want nuclear technology and what should the 
rest of the world do about it? The purpose of this thesis 
is to attempt to answer the first question in order to 
frame America’s response to the second. The premise of this 
thesis is that without understanding why Iran has been so 
driven in its quest to build a nuclear infrastructure, 
America will not be able to make any positive contributions 
to the solution and will in fact make the situation worse. 
 
A. WHY IRAN MATTERS 
Why should America’s inability to connect with Iran be 
of concern? The neighborhood in which Iran lives sits on 
top of the majority of the world’s proven oil reserves.1 
Asia, and to a lesser extent Europe and the United States, 
rely on the Middle East to produce the oil that they 
 
1 Erik Kreil, "Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet," 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html (accessed August 4, 2005). 
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actually use.2 The United States has major suppliers in 
South America, but the price of oil is global, and price 
increases in the Middle East immediately impact the global 
oil markets. 
An actor that threatens the supply of oil to the world 
therefore represents an enormous threat to the security of 
the United States. Operating under this assumption, the 
actions of Tehran assume global dimensions. Should Iran 
aggressively confront its fellow Persian Gulf countries, 
not only would this disrupt world oil markets, but it could 
encourage a regional arms race. Should Iran develop nuclear 
weapons, there is a possibility that another Persian Gulf 
country (Saudi Arabia) would begin work on a “Sunni” bomb 
to equalize the “Shi’a” weapon.3 This possibility becomes a 
near certainty if Iranian nuclear statehood is matched by 
renewed efforts to export the Islamic revolution. The 
desire by other countries in the Middle East to pursue 
nuclear programs would only increase the chances that a 
non-state actor might acquire radiological material or even 
a completed weapon for use in an act of terror. 
The presence of more than one hundred thousand 
American troops in Iraq is another reason why the United 
States needs to find a way to come to terms with Iran. The 
continuing discussion of the Iranian nuclear program and 
the means by which the international community can respond 
to the program are overshadowed by the conflict in Iraq. 
The majority of Iraq is Shi’a, and the acknowledged leader 
for many of those Shi’a, Ayatollah Sistani, is an Iranian 
 
2 Erik Kreil, "Persian Gulf Oil and Gas Exports Fact Sheet." 
3 James Russell, "Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century: A New Security 
Dilemma," Middle East Policy XII, no. 3 (Fall, 2005), 67. 
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citizen. The relative quiet of the southern half of Iraq 
can be at least partially attributed to the continued 
acquiescence of the Shi’a leadership to the presence of 
U.S. troops.4 As Moktada al-Sadr demonstrated in 2004, Shi’a 
leaders have the ability to create very difficult operating 
conditions for Coalition Forces should they so choose.5
In this tense environment, Iran can provide either a 
calming influence or further destabilize the security 
environment. The Iranian leadership emphasize that calm in 
the south of Iraq is the result of Iranian efforts.6 This is 
their leverage. That is, should Iran be sanctioned or hit 
with air strikes because of its nuclear program, the 
security situation could suddenly deteriorate in Iraq. 
Beyond Iran’s ability to create more problems in Iraq, its 
location astride the world’s oil supply lines also gives it 
the ability to throw oil markets into a panic. At a time 
when the global excess pumping capacity has dropped below 
one million barrels a day, any threat to the export of oil 
from the Persian Gulf would be enough to push oil prices 
even higher.7
 
4 Andrew W. Terrill, Nationalism, Sectarianism and the Future of the 
U.S. Presence in Post Saddam Iraq (Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), 50. 
5 In the case of Moktada al-Sadr, the Americans aren’t always the 
primary enemy. Recent clashes between the popular leader and Ayatollah 
Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, 
demonstrate the fragile nature of the intra Shi’a alliance. 
6 Tehran IRNA, "Spokesman Warns US: Iran has 'More Defensive 
Options' Against US Attack," August 14th, 2005. 
7 Tehran Mehr News Agency, "Full Text of Iran’s Statement at IAEA 
Emergency Meeting," August 10th, 2005. “Nuclear energy is expected to 
become once again a primary source of energy, with the rising demand 
for oil and gas and the ensuing increase in the prices, which 
incidentally can sharply accelerate for any political provocation.” 
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American-Iranian relations are the key to the creation 
and maintenance of stability in the Persian Gulf and the 
world oil markets. In order to improve relations, the 
United States and Iran need to come to a mutually agreeable 
understanding of Iran’s nuclear program. This understanding 
is impossible unless America makes an attempt to fully 
understand what the basis is for Iranian policy decisions. 
  
B. METHODOLOGY 
The discussion about why states proliferate is not 
new. These questions have already been framed by authors; 
they now need to be evaluated to see which theories provide 
most accurately the reasons why states proliferate. In a 
broad sense, there are three relevant schools of thought in 
proliferation studies: security, domestic, and normative. 
The security school believes that states will build nuclear 
weapons whenever they feel that there is a security driven 
need to do so.8 The domestic school contains both the idea 
that nuclear weapons can be used to generate political 
power within a state as well as the idea of technological 
imperative.9 The normative school ties the choice states 
make as to whether or not they will pursue nuclear 
technology to the expected international reaction to that 
choice. In an article published in 1996, Scott Sagan 
postulated that the failure of the dominant security school 
to adequately explain nuclear weapons programs in states 
 
8 John Deutsch, "The New Nuclear Threat," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 4 
(Fall, 1992), 120. “The fundamental motivation to seek a weapon is the 
perception that national security will be improved. Most nations prefer 
nuclear weapons because the devices are highly destructive and confer a 
symbolic status.” 
9 This simply states that states possessing the technology to build 
nuclear weapons will be tempted to put that knowledge to use. This is 
closely tied to national pride, and therefore can provide a politician 
with political capital if wielded in the right manner internally. 
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such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya required a new 
approach.10 His paper laid out a multi-causal theory in 
which security, domestic concerns and norms all played 
roles in decision making. 
 As stated by Stephan van Evera, there are three ways 
to find out which of these theories is the most applicable 
to nuclear proliferation: experimentation, observation 
using large “n” analysis, and observation using case 
study.11 In a search for explanations as to why states 
proliferate, the case study appears to be the best (only) 
manner of proceeding. Experimentation is obviously not 
possible, and the limited number of cases limits the 
ability to use large “n” analysis. As van Evera noted 
however, with proper management of the cases, the study 
need not be intrinsically flawed.12
 The selection of case studies for this test of multi-
causality drew from all of the nations that have pursued 
nuclear programs. The first five states were discarded due 
to the very different international norms that were in 
place when they conducted their nuclear programs. The 
remaining states were grouped by region in order to 
eliminate biases based on regional peculiarities. A side 
benefit is that in most of the regions, the states were 
pursuing nuclear technology at about the same time, which 
controls for differences in international norms and 
technological barriers as a function of time period. 
 
10 Scott D. Sagan, "Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three 
Models in Search of a Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (Winter, 
1996-97), 54. 
11 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political 
Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 50. 
12 Ibid., 52. 
6C. ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will be split into three basic sections. 
In the first section a collection of countries will be 
examined to determine whether or not multi-causality 
adequately accounts for their decisions in regards to 
nuclear proliferation. In order to examine a full range of 
causal factors a wide range of states over a broad period 
of time will be examined. Using the results from the 
examination of the case studies, Iran’s decision making 
process will be studied. Using a more in depth case study 
the lessons of more than 50 years of nuclear proliferation 
will be applied to describe the policy choices Iran has 
made in the course of its nuclear program. Using the 
results of the detailed case study of Iran, recommendations 
will then be made for American policy. These 
recommendations will therefore be based on a thorough 
review of previous counter proliferation efforts both 
successful and unsuccessful. The policy options will also 






7                    
II. PROLIFERATION THEORY 
The major theories relating to proliferation are 
security, normative, and domestic. Scott Sagan’s theory of 
multi-causality takes these three schools and combines them 
into one. In order to more fully appreciate the results of 
the case studies the three major schools of proliferation 
theory will be explained in more detail. 
 
A. PROLIFERATION THEORY: SECURITY MODEL 
Former head of the Central Intelligence Agency John 
Deutsch was quoted previously saying that the fundamental 
motivator for proliferation was security driven. The belief 
that nuclear weapons will improve the national security 
situation of a country is the bedrock of this line of 
thought. In his article in International Security titled, 
“Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models In 
Search Of A Bomb” Sagan likens the security driven model to 
a series of chain reactions. Each state that successfully 
developed nuclear weapons drove its neighbors to attempt to 
do the same out of a need to balance the new threat to 
their security.13 In each of the case studies, the presence 
or lack of a security based motivator will be discussed. If 
Mr. Deutsch is correct, then states will attempt to 
proliferate whenever there is a threat to their security. 
 
13 Sagan, Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb, 58. 
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B. PROLIFERATION THEORY: DOMESTIC MODEL 
The domestic model for explaining proliferation theory 
is not as established as the security or normative models.14 
There are however proponents of domestic driven causes for 
proliferation decisions. Peter Lavoy has proposed the 
“nuclear myth maker” scenario. In this case, champions of 
nuclear development marshal the domestic support needed to 
sustain the highly complex and expensive effort to develop 
either nuclear technology or nuclear weapons.15 
Additionally, there is a body of literature that attempts 
to refute a perceived security only bias in international 
relations theory.16 If the domestic reasoning is the most 
important then domestic actors should be able to rally 
support for nuclear programs in the face of negative inputs 
from the security and normative models. Likewise, without 
domestic support, security or normative pressures should 
not be enough to create a proliferating state. 
 
C. PROLIFERATION THEORY: NORMATIVE MODEL 
The normative model rests on the belief that shared 
international values have a decisive impact on the choices 
states make.17 Norms can have two different and opposite 
effects on a nuclear program. The first is that nuclear 
 
14 Sagan, Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb, 64. 
15 Peter R. Lavoy, "Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear 
Proliferation” in The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Weapons Spread 
and what Results, eds. Zachary S. Davis and Benjamin Frankel, 356 
(London, England; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 1993). 
16 Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead: The Domestic Sources of 
International Politics," International Organization 49, no. 4 (Autumn, 
1995), 751. 
17 Sagan, Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb, 73. 
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technology or weapons can serve the same purpose as a 
state’s Olympic team or national airline.18 That is, they 
can serve as a symbol of national strength and 
sophistication. The other effect is the pressure 
international norms can place on a nation to not 
proliferate. Through organizations such as the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), states can face peer pressure 
to abstain from the pursuit of nuclear weapons or nuclear 
technology outside the bounds of the treaty. If norms are 
the primary factor that influences a nation to proliferate 
(or not), then the case studies should demonstrate that 
norms caused a state to take actions even when the domestic 
and security models predict a different course of action. 
 
D. MULTI-CAUSALITY 
Scott Sagan’s theory of multi-causality takes the 
previous three models and combines them. It makes the 
argument that no state makes decisions in a vacuum and that 
there are multiple sources of inputs when a state decides 
whether or not to proliferate.19 Furthermore, Sagan argues 
that the recommendations for policy makers based on the 
different models can be contradictory.20 If multi-causality 
is the best theory to describe proliferation then the case 
studies should demonstrate the presence of each of the 
three previously described schools of thought. A second 
requirement exists that each school should possess equal 
weight in determining the outcome of decision on whether or 
not to proliferate. 
 
18 Sagan, Why do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search 
of a Bomb, 74. 
19 Ibid., 85. 
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III. CASE STUDIES 
In order to test the applicability of multi-causality 
a wide variety of states must be examined. As was 
explained, the use of multi-causality requires a wider 
variety of states to be looked at in order to cover all of 
the variables, and combinations thereof. This chapter will 
be divided into the states that have developed nuclear 
weapons, and those that didn’t. The second part will be 
further divided by region. Each state will be examined for 
evidence of the presence or absence of the security, 
domestic, and normative functions that multi-causality 
predicts will be present.  
 
A. STATES THAT HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
In this grouping are: Israel, Pakistan, India, and 
North Korea (DPRK).21 While Israel has never formally 
declared that it possesses nuclear weapons, it is commonly 
understood to have at least 200 nuclear warheads in various 
stages of readiness.22 Both Pakistan and India have actually 
tested nuclear weapons. In February 2005 the DPRK announced 
that it had nuclear weapons and was going to work on 
expanding its arsenal.23 While Pyongyang has not yet tested 
any of these weapons, or actually demonstrated their 
existence, the Central Intelligence Agency has estimated 
 21 While North Korea has yet to test a nuclear weapon, no one is 
denying that they have enough fissile material or the expertise needed 
to build a primitive but function nuclear weapon. 
22 T. V. Paul and others, Power Versus Prudence : Why Nations Forgo 
Nuclear Weapons (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), 138. 
23 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program 
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service,[2003]), 
http://fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf (accessed September 4, 
2004), 1. 
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that the DPRK could posses enough plutonium for 6-10 
warheads.24 These states represent the failure of the NPT to 
curb state’s appetites for nuclear weapons. Each of these 
states has pursued nuclear weapons even though their 
programs have meant significant sacrifices elsewhere. As 
such, they can be studied to demonstrate which factors are 
strong enough to motivate a state to pursue nuclear weapons 
despite the well known price to be paid for doing so. 
India was the first state in this grouping that went 
ahead with a nuclear weapons program. The presence of a 
Chinese threat to the north of India is the stated reason 
for the program.25 The fact that China and India fought a 
border war in 1962 provides part of the underpinning of 
this reasoning. However, by some estimates the nuclear 
weapons research was already underway in India in the late 
1950s, preceding the Sino-Indian war.26 Another security 
factor used by the Indians is the presence of a Pakistani 
bomb. Since the Pakistani efforts were aided in large part 
by China, this gives India further reason to feel 
threatened. However, neither a Chinese threat, nor a 
Pakistani nuclear threat existed when India began its 
nuclear weapons program.  
The apparent weakness of the security driven argument 
in India is matched by the strength of the domestic 
argument. In the presence of a national desire to obtain 
nuclear weapons, a sense of wounded pride (at having been a 
 
24 Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, 7. 
25 George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb : The Impact on Global 
Proliferation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 419. 
26 Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly 
Arsenals : Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, D.C.: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002), 194. 
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colony), and a dedicated core of scientists who championed 
the program from beginning to fruition, India has all the 
hallmarks of a domestically driven program. One line of 
thought that has particular relevance with respect to India 
is that of the Peter Lavoy’s “nuclear myth maker”. His 
argument is that nuclear programs require champions to 
protect them from other domestic actors that stand to lose 
resources to a nuclear program.27 The archetypal “myth 
maker” would be a man like Homi Bhaba, the “father” of 
India’s bomb, who spent the better portion of his life 
talking up nuclear programs in order to protect them from 
bureaucratic knife fighting.28
Even though the driving force behind India’s nuclear 
program was undoubtedly Bhaba, who began the program before 
the first conflict with China, a security element was still 
present. The proof of its existence is in the continued 
presence of a nuclear weapons program in India. Whereas 
other nations have begun research programs only to turn 
back, India continued with her program through 
international sanctions and diplomatic condemnation. 
India’s program began with the vision of a man, and was 
kept alive through his determination and the presence of 
real security threats; threats that could be sold to a 
nuclear friendly domestic audience without a great deal of 
concern for what the rest of the world thought about the 
program.  
Pakistan is a state whose nuclear program must be seen 
as a direct response to the presence of a program in  
27 Lavoy, Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation, 
356. 
28 Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 194. 
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India.29 At first glance, the security model more than 
adequately describes Pakistan’s program. Islamabad has 
fought three unsuccessful wars with its larger and more 
prosperous neighbor. Pakistan was eventually deprived of 
its eastern half during the third and last war, and has 
seen the Indian province of Kashmir as essentially enemy 
occupied territory. Pakistan has only been able to maintain 
a rough military parity with India through a ruinous 
military budget while its primary supporter, the United 
States, has been an on again-off again friend.30
Even though the security model describes Pakistan’s 
program, India’s example demonstrates the importance of 
other variables. Evidence exists to support the idea of a 
domestic angle to Pakistan’s nuclear program as the nuclear 
tests in 1998 were widely supported by both the government 
of Nawaz Sharif and the opposition.31 Like India, the “myth 
maker” factor is present in Pakistan. The recent 
revelations in regards to A.Q. Khan have served to 
highlight the role that a few individuals played in the 
creation of the Pakistani bomb. His less well known 
competitor Dr. Samar Mubarakmand, the head of the National 
Defense Complex, can also be cast in the role of a myth 
 
29 Cirincione, Wolfsthal and Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 207. 
30 According to the International South Asia Forum, Pakistan’s 
military budget represents 25% of total government spending and 6% of 
GDP. This has led to a tremendous amount of debt that represents a 
figure equal to 93% of Pakistan’s GDP. According the U.S. State 
Department, America leads the international effort to assist in 
Pakistan’s economic rehabilitation. 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3453.htm, (accessed September 10, 
2004). 
31 Paul and others, Power Versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear 
Weapons, 135. 
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maker.32 But before these two men could emerge to drive 
forward the Pakistani nuclear program there was Z.A. 
Bhutto. During the earliest debates over a military use for 
Pakistan’s nuclear program he was the leading champion of 
an atomic bomb.33 The work of Bhutto, and later Kahn and 
Mubarakmand, enabled the nuclear weapons program to survive 
numerous political regimes and changes in international 
pressures. 
The Pakistani nuclear program was therefore the result 
of an easily defined security threat in the form of India. 
A handful of individuals in Pakistan championed the notion 
of a Pakistani bomb and shepherded the program to fruition. 
It is important to note that they did so in the face of 
international sanctions and an unfavorable normative 
environment, demonstrating the power of a perceived 
security threat. 
North Korea’s security problem is readily visible. It 
is one of the most economically and diplomatically isolated 
countries on earth. Not only is North Korea losing ground 
to South Korea militarily and economically, but it also 
faces the United States across the DMZ. For a regime lead 
by a famously idiosyncratic dictator, there seems to be 
ample security reasons for developing a nuclear weapon. 
North Korea’s use of the weapons as bargaining chips 
leads one to suspect something other than a pure security 
reason for their development however. Its isolation and the 
 32 While A.Q. Khan is now practically a household name, Dr. 
Mubarakmand is a relative unknown outside of Pakistan. Using 
www.google.com to search for “A.Q. Khan” yields over 403,000 entries, 
while searching for “Dr. Mubarakmand” yields only 394 entries. 
33 Ashok Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development (London ; New York: 
Croom Helm in association with Methuen, 1987), 77. 
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hostility it perceives directed at it must certainly have a 
role to play in the development of a nuclear weapons 
program. However, if this was the sole reason for the 
creation of North Korea’s illicit research there would be 
little chance of them trading away the weapons for anything 
less than a complete cessation of hostilities. That North 
Korea has been willing to offer the end of the program for 
economic assistance and a mere 500,000 tons of heavy fuel 
oil, indicates that these weapons have other roles to play 
other than merely a last line of defense. Also, 
announcements from North Korea about their nuclear program 
have a correlation to the diplomatic and political actions 
of America.34  
Multi-causality is helpful, but not as much as the 
previous cases. The reason for this is there is little 
evidence to support the claim that norms mean anything to 
the regime in Pyongyang. They have waged a low level war 
with their neighbors to the South and Japan, kidnapping 
citizens from Japan and sending commando teams into South 
Korea. Due to the level of repression North Korea’s 
population lives under there is little opportunity for them 
to make their opinion heard on Pyongyang’s nuclear program, 
which eliminates the possibility of the domestic angle 
playing an important role.  
It seems at times that the intensely negative 
international reaction to the program has been relied upon 
to garner the economic carrots needed to keep the DPRK 
functional. Domestically, the cult of personality around 
Kim Jong-Il has meant that he needs no weapon to play to a 
 34 North Korea’s more bombastic statements have followed items such 
as the “Axis of Evil” speech and the beginning of the US led war 
against Iraq.  
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domestic audience. What pressure the military establishment 
might be applying to the revered leader for the development 
of these weapons is uncertain. However, given the cost of 
such a program, its dubious value to the military, and the 
sacrifices the cost must mean for the military services, it 
is difficult to see why the military would be supportive of 
the project.  
Of all the cases of nuclear weapons acquisition no 
state has as strong a security imperative as Israel. Since 
the rebirth of the Jewish state in 1948 they have fought 4 
wars with their neighbors, usually outnumbered in troops if 
not quality of the equipment those troops were using.35 
While the rhetoric contained within a state’s newspapers is 
not proof in itself of intentions, Israel’s neighbors have 
allowed their newspapers to print some of the most heated 
rhetoric of any regional competition.36 Surrounded, 
outnumbered, and verbally (if not physically) threatened, 
Israel seems to be an ideal candidate for the security 
driven nuclear weapon.37 It is important to note than in the 
case of Israel, the security threat was not nuclear but 
conventional. In this case the presence of nuclear weapons 
is seen as the ultimate answer to Israel’s lack of 
strategic depth. 
 
35 Avner Cohen, "Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and 
the Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars" in Planning the Unthinkable : 
How New Powers Will use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, eds. 
Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan and James J. Wirtz, 104 (Ithaca, N.Y.: 
Cornell University Press, 2000). In the original wars of 1948, Israel 
was very much outgunned both in numbers and quality. Even in 1973 the 
Israeli Armed forces were only evenly matched in most areas excepting 
their air force. 
36 Ibid., 105. It was not uncommon during the 1960’s and 70’s to see 
editorials that called for the annihilation of Israel and political 
cartoons depicting skulls with the Star of David on them. 
37 Ibid., 122. 
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The use of Scott Sagan’s multi-causality model 
provides some additional insight into the Israeli nuclear 
program. Domestically, the Israeli public has always been 
highly supportive of military programs and the democratic 
state spends a large portion of its GDP on the military.38 
The normative portion also sheds some light. When Israel 
was first thought to have built the weapons the Cold War 
was on and both sides in that conflict were building 
enormous numbers of nuclear devices. The nuclear weapon was 
then seen as the ultimate guarantor of a state’s existence. 
Norms also influenced Israeli to keep the program opaque. 
Even in the beginning of the program, Israeli leader David 
Ben Gurion deliberately structured the program to allow 
Israel to claim its activities were for peaceful use only.39  
Each of the states covered in this section 
demonstrates the key status of security driven decision 
making. Each of the states faces (or believes it faces) a 
nuclear armed opponent, or in the case of Israel, an 
implacable foe bent on its destruction. More important, 
these states have demonstrated a willingness to ignore 
international norms in their pursuit of nuclear technology. 
At the same time, Pakistan and India also demonstrate the 
importance of the “myth maker” to the successful conclusion 
of a nuclear research program. Even though these case 
studies are strongly supportive of a security only model, 
the deal that North Korea made to exchange its nuclear 
 38 According to Anthony Cordesman, Israeli defense spending from 
1985-2000 averaged 14.06% of the Israeli GDP. By way of comparison, 
American defense spending as a percentage of GDP averaged 3.32% from 
1990-2000. 
39 Avner Cohen, Nuclear Arms in Crisis Under Secrecy: Israel and the 
Lessons of the 1967 and 1973 Wars., 106. 
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weapons program for foreign aid calls into question whether 
security alone drives these decisions. 
 
B. STATES THAT WANTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EUROPE 
Because of the Cold War and the early imbalance in 
forces between the West and the Soviet block there were 
many reasons for nations in Europe to consider developing 
nuclear weapons. Differences in opinion between the US and 
her allies in Europe, as well as American actions taken 
elsewhere in the world led European states at various times 
to question whether or not Washington would truly come to 
Europe’s defense. The importance of these case studies 
rests in the fact that despite occasional doubts about the 
steadfastness of America, no European nation other than 
Great Britain and France developed nuclear weapons. 
Germany is an interesting study. After World War II 
they were still considered a threat by most of their 
neighbors and had been constrained by several treaties in 
their ability to rearm. On top of their mandated weakness, 
Germany suspected that they would be the battlefield for 
the next war, this one far more destructive due to the 
advent of nuclear weapons.40 This fear, combined with the 
European suspicion that the US might retreat to “fortress 
America”, led some German leaders to consider a nuclear 
program. 
Due to the presence of an enormous Soviet army in 
Eastern Europe, an army that far outnumbered the combined 
Western forces, there is a good argument to be made for the  
40 Jennifer Mackby and Walter B. Slocombe, "Germany : The Model 
Case, a Historical Imperative" in The Nuclear Tipping Point : Why 
States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert 
J. Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, 183 (Washington, D.C: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2004). 
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security thesis on weapons development. Germany was split 
in half, occupied, and the front line for a conflict 
between East and West. Developing nuclear weapons might 
have guaranteed the integrity of Germany’s borders while 
keeping other people from using its cities and farms as a 
battlefield. Lacking an army of its own, nuclear weapons 
would have seemed to be the easiest way to build an 
enormous defensive ability.41 Another security driven reason 
for a German nuclear program would be to ensure that German 
soldiers were more than just a shield with which to hold 
the Soviets at bay while the other NATO members dropped 
bombs.42
At the time the internal debate over a nuclear weapon 
program was begun, nuclear weapons were just another 
battlefield tool. Unlike Japan, the German public was not 
inherently anti-nuclear due to the difference in the way 
WWII had ended for Berlin. International norms were 
supportive of nuclear weapons and the German public was not 
vociferous in its opposition, so why did Germany not go 
ahead? According to Jennifer Mackby and Walter Slocombe, it 
was the guarantee of security by America and the other 
members of NATO that convinced Germany to forgo nuclear 
weapons.43
At first glance, the security model does an excellent 
job of explaining why Sweden would choose to pursue nuclear 
weapons. It was in the middle of the Cold War battleground 
between East and West, and had negative experiences trying 
 41Mackby and Slocombe, Germany: The Model Case, a Historical 
Imperative, 181. Some German leaders saw nuclear weapons specifically 
as a way to make up for their inability to raise a large army. 
42 Ibid., 183. 
43 Ibid., 199. 
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to remain neutral in both the World Wars.44 While Sweden 
claimed it was supported under the US nuclear umbrella, 
they had just as much reason to question the utility of 
that umbrella as England and France, perhaps more so due to 
their international claim to neutrality. The security model 
can also be used to explain why Sweden might have chosen to 
refrain from continuing the program. Another factor in 
Sweden’s calculations was possession of nuclear weapons, 
even as a neutral state, could lead to Russia targeting 
them with Moscow’s own nuclear weapons.45
Despite the apparent strength of the security model, 
multi-causality proves to be a useful tool in explaining 
Sweden’s actions. While there was a security threat to be 
considered, Sweden also had a domestic element which was 
closely linked to the issue of norms. Sweden’s population 
was at the forefront of questioning of the moral legitimacy 
of nuclear weapons and the government pursued nuclear 
weapons bans in the international arena. Another domestic 
element was the creation of a welfare state in Sweden. This 
very popular move was extremely expensive; there was not 
room for everything in Sweden’s budget. Therefore, the 
nuclear weapons program, whose utility was increasingly 
coming under question, was axed to help pay for welfare.46 
Therefore, the addition of domestic political 
considerations and norms in Sagan’s model both add depth to 
the security driven understanding of Sweden’s choices. 
 
44 Paul Cole, Atomic Bombast: Nuclear Weapon Decision-Making in 
Sweden (Washington D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center,[1996]), 9. 
45 Ibid., 28. 
46 Ibid., 28. 
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Sweden and Germany demonstrate that even in the face 
of demonstrated security needs nuclear weapons are always 
considered vital to a nation’s security. In the case of 
both countries the presence of a security umbrella was used 
by the governments to justify their decision not to develop 
nuclear weapons. The Swedish case study also validates 
multi-causality through the additional inputs of domestic 
priorities and public opinion based on developing 
international norms. 
 
C. STATES THAT WANTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE MIDDLE EAST 
This region has a cluster of states that pursued 
nuclear weapons programs. Other than Israel, none have yet 
succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, and most have only 
limited access to basic nuclear technology. Despite this 
failure, the examples of Libya and Egypt offer an 
opportunity to test multi-causality under two different but 
related sets of variables. Libya faced a perceived security 
threat from both the United States and Israel, both nuclear 
powers. Egypt borders Israel and has fought three wars with 
her. Despite the shared enemy in Israel, Libya and Egypt 
took separate paths. The different choices taken by the two 
states offer a chance to test whether multi-causality can 
describe the choices made by each of the actors. 
Libya was once the icon of a rogue state. It had an 
unelected leader who supported terrorists and thumbed his 
nose at the United States. Washington D.C. had occasion to 
respond to these provocations and the two states clashed, 
costing Qaddafi several MIGs and his daughter. For years 
the West watched warily as Libya excavated a mountain and 
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turned it into an air strike proof repository.47 Then, in 
2003, seemingly out of the blue, Libya announced it had 
been pursuing various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs and that it was giving them all up. In return for 
the lifting of international sanctions against him, Qadaffi 
was willing to tell all. The reasons given for Libya’s 
change in course have depended on who is giving them. 
Because of Libya’s conflict with the United States, 
and rhetoric directed by Tripoli against Israel, its 
decision to embark on a program to produce nuclear weapons 
is no surprise. Libya’s conventional forces had fared 
poorly in multiple outings against the US. While support 
for various terrorist organizations did score some 
“successes” for Libya, these only served to bring the ire 
of most of Europe down on them in addition to America’s 
wrath. Another security related reason for Libya’s program 
could have been the ultimate goal of giving it up for 
security guarantees. TV Paul has suggested that just such 
an arrangement is key to convincing “rogue” regimes to 
abandon their illegal weapons programs.48  
Multi-causality adds some dimension to the problem 
through the examination of Qadaffi’s domestic issues. He 
has survived several assassination attempts that have 
severely wounded him in at least one case.49 Returning 
istan have begun to plague him with  47 The site was named Tarhuna and was constructed after Rabita 
became the focus on international condemnation. 
48 Paul and others, Power Versus Prudence : Why Nations Forgo 
Nuclear Weapons, 144. 
49 "Al-Qaeda Targets Gaddafi," National Post, December 24, 2004. The 
suggestion that Qaddafi might be targeted by Al-Qaeda was reported by 
Canadian intelligence. According to these reports, the Al-Qaeda backed 
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group wants to replace Qaddafi and create an 
Islamic state in Libya. 
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calls for a greater Islamic role in Libya’s government and 
it is highly likely that these groups are responsible for 
the attempts on Qaddafi’s life. Also, Libya has realized 
that it could not completely develop its natural resources 
without aid from the Europeans and America.50  
Libya also introduces a new twist to the domestic leg 
of Sagan’s theory. Since it was buying the capability “off 
the shelf” from A.Q. Khan’s network there was almost no 
opportunity for a domestic lobby to form around it. 
Purchasing the equipment also meant less funds for Libya’s 
military without any immediate benefit. The lack of a 
dedicated cadre of nuclear scientists further prevented the 
domestic lobby from forming which would then have attempted 
to steer Qaddafi away from giving up the program. In the 
case of Libya, the lack of a domestic lobby meant that 
there were not significant groups within Qaddafi’s regime 
that would have pressured for the nuclear program’s 
continued existence. 
Libya’s neighbor to the east also had a nuclear 
program for a time however; Egypt ended hers long before 
Libya’s started. Egypt is an interesting case due to the 
fact that it has been at war with a nuclear power with 
which it shares borders. The fact that its program died so 
early and with so little progress is educational. 
While the security model might seem to favor an 
Egyptian bomb, this would not produce an accurate 
representation unless the larger picture was considered. 
Egypt has been under the protection of one or both of the 
world’s superpowers throughout its post colonial history. 
 
50 Muhammad Ibrahim, "The Day After - Libya's Sons also Rise," 
Foreign Policy 139 (Nov-Dec, 2003), 32-46. 
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However despite the fact that it fought three wars with 
Israel and lost each one, Egypt has never been threatened 
with destruction by Israel. While Egypt was the ally of the 
USSR during part of the Cold War, it also received 
diplomatic aid from the US during the 1956 invasion by 
Britain, France and Israel.51 After the Camp David accords 
Egypt became the number two recipient of US foreign aid, 
second only to Israel.52 This larger picture therefore shows 
that despite the presence of an Israeli bomb, Egypt has 
never honestly felt itself threatened by that ability and 
has always had at least one superpower to call an ally. 
On the domestic side of the question, Egypt was 
ambivalent soil for the growth of a nuclear capability. Its 
early efforts to attain nuclear technology and “know how” 
died young, and the trained scientists were soon lost.53 
After the “Atoms for Peace” loophole closed, the costs for 
attaining knowledge and equipment that had been offered 
freely as a part of that program climbed precipitously. On 
the normative side, the closing of the Atoms for Peace 
gateway also marked the end of the “it’s just another 
weapon” mentality in the world.  
 
51 Steven Z. Freiberger, Dawn Over Suez: The Rise of American Power 
in the Middle East, 1953-1957, (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1992). Egypt 
started its post colonial life with the United States as a protector. 
During the 1956 war both the United States and the USSR warned France, 
England, and Israel to halt their attack. After the United States 
backed out of the Aswan Dam project the USSR became the primary 
supporter of Egypt. Finally, after the Camp David accords signed by 
Anwar Sadat, Egypt returned to the United States as an ally. 
52 Bessma Momani, "Promoting Economic Liberalization in Egypt: From 
US Foreign Aid to Trade and Investment," Middle East Review of 
International Affairs 7, no. 3 (2003), 88. 
53 Robert J. Einhorn, "Egypt : Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear 
Course" in The Nuclear Tipping Point : Why States Reconsider their 
Nuclear Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell 
Reiss (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 57. 
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Once the early cadre of nuclear scientists had faded 
from view, there was no one in Egypt that was willing or 
able to champion the cause of nuclear weapons. Even though 
some attempts were made to maintain a minimal knowledge of 
nuclear technology, the overall poor condition of Egypt’s 
educational system meant that there was little they could 
do. In the end, Egypt’s attempts to find a path for 
acquiring fissile material were unsuccessful during the 
period in which it was most intent on acquiring nuclear 
weapons.54  
Both Egypt and Libya share similarities in reasoning. 
Despite its past enmity with the United States, Libya has 
come to an understanding with Washington D.C. Since America 
was Libya’s biggest external threat, normalized relations 
with America removes that motivator. Both Libya and Egypt 
serve as powerful examples of security driven decision 
making. In these two cases, the presence of an external 
actor offering security guarantees (the United States) led 
to decisions not to proliferate. In Libya, the new focus on 
internal threats demonstrates a rational choice on the part 
of Qadaffi to give up a program that was already under 
considerable threat in order to gain access to resources 
that would help him shore up his regime at home. Egypt 
decided that it could gain more security from a partnership 
with the United States than it could through a nuclear 
program. Both states also demonstrate the importance of a 




 54 Robert J. Einhorn, Egypt : Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear 
Course, 46. 
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D. STATES THAT WANTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS: AUSTRALIA 
The case of Australia is actually two separate cases, 
each with its own motivating factors. In the first case the 
world had just entered the nuclear age and nuclear weapons 
were signs of modernity and technical prowess. Nuclear 
weapons were at this time “just another artillery shell”.55 
In this global atmosphere, Australia pursued nuclear 
weapons as a means of demonstrating its sophistication. 
Certain senior officers in the Australian armed forces were 
also afraid that they would be left out of future war plans 
if they lacked nuclear weaponry. Australia had enormous 
uranium reserves, and was already being used by Britain 
both as a uranium mine and a testing area for British 
nuclear devices.56 The Australian government, despite 
indications from England that a request for a weapon would 
be honored, declined. 
The second case begins in 1960’s. By that time China 
had detonated its first nuclear weapon, while the British 
were slowly retreating from the Pacific. In this power 
vacuum Australia’s motivation for seeking nuclear 
technology changed from one of national prestige to a 
security driven desire. While Australia certainly had the 
resources to pursue this program, the increasingly negative 
image being attached to nuclear weapons possession added 
political considerations to the decision. In the end, 
Australia chose security guarantees from the United States 
and pursued a nuclear disarmament program in the 
international arena. 
 
55 Jim Walsh, "Surprise Down Under: The Secret History of 
Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions," Nonproliferation Review 5, no. 1 
(1997), 2. 
56 Ibid., 6. 
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In both stages of Australia’s nuclear weapons program 
it lacked a close security threat. During the second period 
discussed both India and China, regional powers in 
Australia’s backyard, possessed nuclear weapons. Even so, 
there were no significant points of friction between those 
two nations and Australia. Domestically, the primary 
champions of a nuclear weapons program in Australia were 
the senior officers in the military. Without a domestic 
lobby or a credible security threat, these leaders were not 
able to sustain pressure for a program in the face of 
changing norms and the promise of security guarantees from 
the United States. 
Australia’s case reinforces the need for a genuine 
security threat in order to support a nuclear weapons 
program. Australia further adds to the evidence that 
domestic pressure against nuclear weapons can play a role. 
In the case of Australia, security guarantees from America 
were sufficient to keep that country non-nuclear despite 
the clear capability to develop a nuclear program.  
 
E. STATES THAT WANTED NUCLEAR WEAPONS: EAST ASIA 
The East Asian states of Taiwan, South Korea, and 
Japan offer another chance to test multi-causality. Each of 
the states faces a nuclear threat, while possessing varying 
levels of domestic issues, technological ability, and 
external security considerations.  
Taiwan’s “Hsin Chu” program was conducted in secret as 
a means of developing nuclear weapons. While this program 
was eventually canceled, it gives an interesting lesson in 
the negative security effects of nuclear weapons. The 
program led to a Taiwanese realization that their efforts 
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would not strengthen Taiwan’s defenses but risk the 
complete destruction of the island. This realization was 
the result of an American communiqué that it would do 
nothing to protect the island if Taiwan continued with 
their program.57  
Multi-causality adds some additional information to 
the discussion of Taiwan’s program. The obvious security 
concerns aside, there were domestic and normative elements 
in Taiwan’s decision to give up the program. When the Hsin 
Chu program started, Taiwan was ruled by an authoritarian 
government. The lack of a free press and opposition parties 
allowed a small group of advisers close the Chiang-Kai 
Shek, to choose a nuclear path.58. Later, when its nuclear 
armed foe, China, had begun to issue more threats, the 
Taiwanese nation, with an anti-nuclear president, free 
press, and opposition parties was in no danger of 
backsliding.  
Japan is an interesting study; of all the “latent 
nuclear states” it is probably the most latent. It draws 
over 31% of its energy from nuclear power, and possesses 
the most modern techniques in uranium enrichment and 
plutonium separation.59 Despite this capability Japan has 
long been one of the worlds most outspoken critics of 
 
57 Derek J. Mitchell, "Taiwan's Hsin Chu Program : Deterrence, 
Abandonment, and Honor" in The Nuclear Tipping Point : Why States 
Reconsider their Nuclear Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. 
Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss, 309 (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2004). 
58 Ibid., 296. 
59 "Japan: Energy, Economic and Electricity Information," 
International Atomic Energy Agency, http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofile
s/Japan/Japan2003.htm (accessed April 5, 2005). 
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nuclear weapons; cracks have begun to show in the Japanese 
anti-nuclear façade however. 
Any nuclear weapons program in Japan would be 
tremendously aided by two facts: 1) They already posses an 
abundance of fissile material and 2) they have a large 
number of very well trained nuclear scientists. Japan is a 
case of a country that is literally only a political 
decision away from having nuclear weapons. Since it has 
never had a declared (or illicit, as far as is known) 
nuclear weapons program, it is difficult to apply any of 
our models to examine it. However, recent statements from 
Japan indicate that a debate has begun about whether or not 
they should reconsider their stance.60  
The first leg of the multi-causality triad is 
security. In the case of Japan, the main security threat is 
a clear nuclear weapons capability in North Korea.61 Japan’s 
security concerns are larger than the DPRK however; China 
is also seen as a long term strategic threat to Japan. 
Rounding out Japan’s security concerns is a resurgent 
Russia, fear of American drift towards China, and 
international terrorism. Added up, these threats create a 
powerful incentive to utilize already existing facilities 
and stockpiles to create nuclear weapons in Japan. At the 





60 Campbell, Kurt M. and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, "Japan : Thinking the 
Unthinkable" in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their 
Nuclear Choices, eds. Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell 
Reiss, 230 (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 
61 Ibid., 231. 
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and Nagasaki has led to an increase in the number of 
Japanese citizens that are willing to consider nuclear 
weapons.62  
The norm related concerns of Japan are largely related 
to the NPT.63 The announcement by North Korea that is has 
nuclear weapons has exposed cracks in the foundation of the 
treaty. Should Iran achieve nuclear weapons status other 
states are going to begin to question whether or not they 
should continue to be a party to the treaty. Another crack 
in the NPT has been statements from the Bush administration 
that they are considering developing a new class of nuclear 
weapons designed to produce very low yields. The new 
weapons concern the Japanese, who feel that any attempt to 
build them increases the likelihood that nuclear weapons 
will be used in future conflicts.64
Like that of Japan, the South Korean nuclear research 
program was also directly related to the threat from North 
Korea. The Korean peninsula has a long history of war and 
occupation, the most recent being the Korean Civil War. 
This fight ended with the peninsula split at the 38th 
parallel and an armistice. This armistice did not prevent 
North Korea from making at least two attempts on South 
Korean strongman President Park’s life; the second attempt 
missed him but killed his wife.65 In short, South Korea 
faced an aggressive neighbor whose military budget 
 
62 Campbell and Sunohara, Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable, 242. 
63 Ibid., 240. 
64 Ibid., 240. 
65 Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear 
Nonproliferation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 83. 
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represented 15% of its GDP.66 Despite this powerful 
perception of threat, South Korea has refrained from 
further pursuit of nuclear weapons. In its transition to 
democracy, South Korea resembles Taiwan. However, unlike 
Taiwan, South Korea also has an explicit security guarantee 
from the United States, which mirrors the status of Japan. 
The three case studies from East Asia demonstrate 
again the power of security driven decision making. Like 
the European cases, they also demonstrate the additional 
consideration of domestic politics. That a debate exists at 
all in Japan over the future of that nation’s nuclear 
status is an example to the shift over time of domestic 
forces. In Taiwan and South Korea, a shift from an 
autocratic regime to a democratic regime has added the 
presence of domestic pressure against the creation of a 
nuclear program. Japan and South Korea, and Taiwan all 
demonstrate the ability of external security guarantees to 
take the place of nuclear weapons programs in the face of a 
clear and demonstrated threat. 
 
F. IN SEARCH OF A MODEL 
The intention of this chapter was to use case studies 
in order to pinpoint the reasons states chose to pursue (or 
not) nuclear weapons. Each case demonstrated that the 
presence of security concerns was the foundation for the 
consideration of a nuclear program. At the same time, the 
cases showed that security concerns are never the only 
input to be considered when deciding whether or not to 
pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the case studies 
d of a horizontal structure in which  
66 Mitchell Reiss, Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear 
Nonproliferation, 82. 
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security, domestic, and normative concerns work in unison, 
it may be helpful to think of proliferation decisions as a 
vertical structure. At the bottom are security concerns 
which form a necessary basis for proliferation decisions. 
On top of this foundation are then stacked norms, domestic 
concerns, and technological capabilities. Combined, this 
structure informs a state’s decisions on proliferation. The 
difference between this idea and multi-causality such as 
Scott Sagan’s model is the necessity for the security 
requirement to exist before a program can be seriously 
contemplated.67 However, the presence of a security threat 
alone is not necessarily enough to cause a state to 
proliferate. Cases such as Egypt and Taiwan demonstrate 
that even states that face nuclear armed opponents don’t 
always produce nuclear weapons. The right combination of 
domestic and normative imperatives must exist, along with 
the capability to produce a nuclear infrastructure (or the 
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IV. FACTORS INFLUENCING PROLIFERATION IN IRAN 
In the previous section, a series of case studies were 
examined for evidence supporting multi-causality as a 
useful way of understanding nuclear proliferation. The 
result of the case study was that while there are multiple 
inputs to decision makers, these inputs are not equal. In 
order for a state to proliferate it needs a clear security 
threat. If this threat exists, then further considerations 
such as domestic support, normative pressures, and 
technological capability are added. If a state faces a 
perceived, significant security threat, can muster domestic 
support, can evade or withstand international normative 
pressure, and either has the technological capability to 
proliferate, or can purchase nuclear technology, then the 
state will proliferate. Many of the case studies 
demonstrated that a change in one or more of these factors 
will cause a state to reconsider its choice to proliferate. 
 
A. SECURITY 
The first motivating factor to consider is security. 
In the broadest sense, Iran’s security problems are obvious 
are first glance. A look at a map of Iran and its 
surrounding areas shows it to be in a neighborhood fraught 
with uncertainty and instability. Not only is Iran 
surrounded by new and/or fragile states, but since 9/11 it 
is also surrounded by the armed forces of the United 
States. Since the fall of the Shah and the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979 the United States and Iran have at times 
fought each other, threatened each other, or just ignored 
each other. This cycle of neglect and antagonism directly 
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flavors the relations between these two states in the 
current atmosphere of concern over the Iranian nuclear 
research program. Therefore the presence, on all sides of 
Iran, of American forces is understandably a significant 
factor in Iranian security calculations. Another problem is 
that the nations do not have diplomatic relations with each 
other significantly hampering attempts at real 
communication. 
Unfortunately, the various modes of conduct between 
the two countries have done nothing to reassure either when 
it comes to the other’s intentions. Since 1979 Iran has had 
to deal with the near continuous presence of American 
warships in the Persian Gulf, which was once an Iranian 
lake. The presence of these forces and the power they 
represent was dramatically demonstrated to the Iranians in 
1988 during Operation Praying Mantis in which a large 
portion of the Iranian Navy was sunk or damaged. As Ken 
Pollack points out in his book “Persian Puzzle”, the 
accidental downing of the Iranian Airbus later that year by 
the USS Vincennes was a wakeup call to the regime in 
Tehran, and directly led to cessation of hostile 
activities.68
The advent of the Global War on Terror brought fresh 
attention to the newly liberated “Stan Republics” of 
Central Asia, as well as Afghanistan. The ability to access 
landlocked Afghanistan was partially insured through the 
basing of US forces in countries to the north, which had 
the simultaneous effect of establishing bases north of 
Iran. The invasion of Iraq established an enormous American 
 
68 Kenneth M. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict between 
Iran and America, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2004), 539. 
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force directly across Iran’s western border. The display of 
firepower which brought down the entire Iraqi regime in 
such a short time span, something the entire Iranian nation 
had been unable to do so over eight years of war, was also 
a potent reminder of just how powerful the United States 
had become. Finally, the encirclement of Iran was completed 
by the arrival of US military trainers in Azerbaijan in an 
effort to build that country’s military.69 The trainers in 
Azerbaijan happened to coincide with increased levels of 
tension between that country and Iran, a fact that was not 
overlooked in Tehran. 
Iran’s security is not just predicated on the presence 
of American military forces, although that is their primary 
concern.70 Iran still has contested claims over a series of 
small islands just inside the Persian Gulf, whose ownership 
is contested by the UAE. The possible presence of oil and 
natural gas fields near these islands has made the issue 
even thornier than it was to start with.71 While Iran and 
the UAE had a dual use agreement for the islands, Iran has 
recently placed armed forces on the islands and started 
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70 Seymour Hersch, "The Coming Wars," The New Yorker, Janaury 24, 
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of the United States due to the island’s strategic position 
astride one of the sea lanes leading through the Straits of 
Hormuz.  
There is another facet of security that deserves some 
discussion. Iran feels that its national security is 
directly linked to its possession of nuclear technology. In 
an article published in Tehran recently, Iranian political 
commentator Dr. Ali Akbari stated that “technology and 
methods of the development of energy, especially nuclear 
energy, are among the strategic dimensions of power.” 73 The 
reason they feel this link exists is because of the fact 
that Iran’s internal consumption of energy is rapidly 
increasing. Iran relies heavily on oil exports to finance 
their economy. A future in which Iran were to either 
require a significant fraction of its oil and gas for 
domestic consumption, or, worse yet, become a net importer 
is disastrous. The Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom 
said as much in a letter he wrote to the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Foreign Affairs. In this letter he 
pointed out the potential for Iran to become a net importer 
of fossil fuels unless it diversifies its energy grid. The 
Ambassador went on to point out that if Iran were to reach 
a goal of 7000 megawatts (MW) of nuclear electricity 
generation they would annually save over 190 million 
barrels of oil. This comes out to an annual savings of over 
$11.7 billion using the recent oil price of $62 a barrel. 
Furthermore, when considering whether or not Iran’s 
investment in Bushehr makes sense consider the following; 
Bushehr is a 1000MW plant, and it cost over $3.2 billion to 
 
73 Ali Reza Akbari, "Iran's Nuclear Security Capability: An 
Examination of the Role and Place of Nuclear Capability," E'Tedal Va 
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construct when the original German built plant’s costs are 
figured in.74 Based on the oil saving calculations of the 
Ambassador, this plant will save Iran $1.6 billion in oil 
per year of use.75 That means that in 2 years the plant will 
have paid for itself. This doesn’t take into account 
fluctuations in the price of oil, which could add a 
significant amount of money to the pot if oil prices 
continue to rise. For every dollar a barrel that oil prices 




The issue of norms and their effect on any possible 
Iranian program to build nuclear weapons has become more 
apparent recently with the declaration by North Korea that 
it has nuclear weapons. The main threat that this North 
Korean adventurism poses in the case of Iran is that if 
North Korea tests a nuclear weapon and the world sits by, 
Iran may begin to ask itself why it shouldn’t have the same 
technology. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
which has already lost some of its power due to the quiet 
consent of the world’s other nuclear powers to the nuclear 
status of Israel, Pakistan, and India would become almost 
meaningless if North Korea were to be afforded the same 
latitude. Further attention has been directed at the NPT 
 
74 Global Security, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Bushehr," 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm (accessed 
August 4, 2005).. 
75 At $62 dollars a barrel of oil. 
76 If, as was suggested by former ARAMCO executive Sadad al-
Husseini, oil prices are headed for triple digits Iran’s savings 
increase further. At $100 a barrel of oil Bushehr saves Iran $2.7 
billion a year in oil costs while a 7K MW program results in an extra 
$19 billion a year in oil sales. 
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with recent announcements that America will end several 
decades of nuclear embargo against India. This announcement 
puts additional strain on the normative strength of the 
NPT.77 The treaty was intended to allow members access to 
non-weapon nuclear technology in return for their adherence 
to the non-proliferation portions of the NPT, not access to 
non-signatory states and intrusive inspections for members.  
Another problem that the NPT poses is Article VI 
requiring the declared nuclear states to phase out their 
arsenals.78 During the Cold War this was largely overlooked 
by all sides. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union 
however, there have been an increasing number of calls for 
the “original five” to perform their Article VI 
obligations. Not only have the original nuclear powers not 
disarmed, but some have recently declared their intent to 
produce new, more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Research 
on the “Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator” (RNEP), a nuclear 
device for reaching deeply buried targets, is a topic of 
discussion in the American Congress. In fact, the total 
amount allotted to the program over a 5 year period is in 
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notice that the world’s most powerful state in the 
conventional realm still values its nuclear weapons enough 
to try and update them. 
On top of the “do as I say not as I do” feeling that 
American nuclear renovation sends to states like Iran there 
is another disturbing signal. This is that nuclear weapons 
may be re-engineered to return the sense of utility that 
accompanied the weapons early in their career. As the 
decline of the “tactical warhead” in world arsenals 
attests, nuclear weapons are no longer weapons of war, but 
instruments of strategic power. However, the RNEP, and 
other low yield warhead designs is an obvious attempt to 
return utility to nuclear weapons. By attempting to 
demonstrate that nuclear weapons can be built to decrease 
their side effects to “tolerable” limits, America is 
inadvertently telegraphing that they will consider using 
them. This, when combined with the tremendous conventional 
strength demonstrated by the American military has weakened 
international norms against nuclear weapons. A country like 
Iran that finds itself opposing the United States can’t 
help but notice that North Korea, which occupies the third 
slot on the “Axis of Evil”, has not been attacked despite 
its open declaration of nuclear weapons. After the swift 
destruction of Iraq twice in the space of 12 years (a 
country lacking nuclear weapons) Iran might have taken a 
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C. TECHNOLOGICAL 
The technological aspect of acquiring nuclear weapons 
favors Iran. The primary factor keeping many nations from 
developing nuclear weapons is that they require so much 
effort and money to produce. With its burgeoning nuclear 
program, Iran already has in place those technologies that 
are needed to produce nuclear weapons. Iran has uranium ore 
mining facilities, uranium conversion facilities, uranium 
centrifuge facilities, and an indigenous missile industry. 
This means that Iran can mine, process, convert and enrich 
uranium sufficiently to use in a uranium based nuclear 
weapon. Iran can also build test, and deploy missiles 
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. One area in which 
Iran has not yet demonstrated any capability is building 
nuclear warheads. While a simple gun type bomb is 
relatively easy to construct, miniaturizing a nuclear 
warhead sufficiently to place it on a ballistic missile is 
an order of magnitude harder.81
In order to understand the breadth of Iran’s program 
it is helpful to look at exactly what Iran possesses in the 
way of nuclear facilities. The most well known is the 
nuclear power plant at Bushehr. This facility was 
originally begun by the German company Siemens prior to the 
fall of the Shah. During the Iran-Iraq war it was 
repeatedly bombed by the Iraqis. The nearly destroyed 
facility lay abandoned until 1995 when a Russian consortium 
inked a deal to build a Russian nuclear facility on the 
site. While the construction process was repeatedly 
 
81 Gotz Neuneck, "Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction," 
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/TWoMDpapers.htm (accessed August 20, 
2005).Building an implosion type device is far more difficult than 
building a gun type device. The implosion style nuclear device are the 
design used for missile warheads. 
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delayed, the reactor was largely complete by 2004.82 In 
February of 2005, the Russian government, under pressure 
from the United States, forced Iran to sign a deal in which 
the Russians would supply the enriched uranium needed to 
run the reactor and would take back the spent fuel for 
reprocessing.83 This bargain was pushed on the Russians due 
to the fact that if Iran was allowed to keep the spent fuel 
they would have access to nuclear weapons material. The 
1000 MW reactor at Bushehr is expected to annually produce 
enough plutonium for approximately 20 nuclear weapons a 
year.84 In order to do so, Iran would need to construct a 
spent fuel reprocessing facility. Currently no open source 
evidence suggest that they have done anything more than 
bench tests of reprocessesing techniques.85
The second major center of Iranian nuclear activity is 
Esfahan. This town is the site of Iran’s uranium conversion 
facilities. The purpose of these facilities is to take 
mined uranium and convert it first into yellowcake and then 
into uranium hexafluoride. This second step is important as 
it is required before the uranium can be introduced into 
centrifuges to be enriched. All work at this facility was 
 
82 Global Security, "Weapons of Mass Destruction: Bushehr," 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/bushehr.htm (accessed 
August 4, 2005). Iranian government officials have repeatedly condemned 
what they claim was American interference in Russia’s attempt to finish 
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repeated in the Iranian media for issues as diverse as unrest in 
Kurdistan and an air strike scare caused by demolition work conducted 
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84 Victor Galinsky, "Iran's Legal Paths to the Bomb" in Checking 
Iran's Nuclear Ambitions, eds. Henry Sokloski and Patrick Clawson, 28 
(Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004). 
85 Sharon Squassoni, Iran's Nuclear Program: Recent Developments 
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suspended after Iran accepted a deal from the so called 
“European Troika” of France, England, and Germany in an 
attempt to defuse the growing tensions over Iran’s nuclear 
research program. In early August 2005 Iran announced its 
intentions to remove the seals on this facility and restart 
the uranium conversion process. While Iran currently does 
not have the large number of centrifuges needed to conduct 
a military enrichment program, their ability to build even 
first generation centrifuges means that constructing an 
enrichment program is not beyond their reach. 
The third center of nuclear related activity is 
Natanz. This location gained notoriety after a dissident 
Iranian group revealed that a massive construction 
operation was underway to build and then bury two enormous 
buildings. The immediate conclusion was that Iran was 
attempting to hide and/or protect a centrifuge facility 
that might be capable of holding as many as 50,000 
centrifuges. While America spy satellites watched, two 
buildings were submerged under seventy five feet of dirt 
and one and a half meter thick concrete walls.86 After a 
concerted international diplomatic effort to extract some 
answers, Iran admitted that it was building a centrifuge 
facility in Natanz, but stated that it was not prohibited 
from enriching uranium under its NPT obligations.  
The fourth and final location is Arak, where a heavy 
water production facility is nearing completion. Heavy 
water is an excellent moderator for the production of 
weapons grade plutonium in specially built reactors. In 
fairness it is worth noting that heavy water can also be 
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used in nuclear plants whose primary purpose is energy 
forced a line of text down for more text at top of page 
production. However, the design of these plants has fallen 
into disfavor due to the proliferation potential they 
possess. 
In the process of building these and other facilities 
Iran has received much aid from abroad. Russia, Pakistan, 
China, and North Korea have been implicated in transfers of 
technology to Iran that could aid its weapons program.87 The 
biggest concern has been the participation of the A.Q. Khan 
network based in Pakistan. Experts are nearly certain that 
Iran received centrifuges from Pakistan, possibly even 
advanced designs using maraging steel.88 What’s worse, there 
is evidence to support claims that Pakistan had previously 
sold a diagram for a Chinese nuclear warhead to Libya, 
which would have been sufficiently miniaturized to fit on a 
ballistic missile.89 If this is the case, then there is the 
possibility that Iran might have purchased the same 
information from A.Q. Khan when they bought their 
centrifuges. The possession of such blueprints would 
eliminate most of the testing and experimentation that 
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would normally be associated with miniaturizing a nuclear 
warhead sufficiently to fit on a missile. The elimination 
of the testing is especially critical as it is something 
that is relatively easy to detect by other countries.90 
Unfortunately, the lack of the blueprints does not mean 
that Iran couldn’t build a nuclear weapon. Only that the 
first generation of such weapons would be too large to fit 
on a missile and would need to be aircraft mounted.91
 
D. POLITICAL 
The political reasons to build a nuclear weapon are 
many and varied. The first political reason relates to 
international leverage. That is, aside from the purely 
security related reasons for building a weapon already 
discussed; the presence of a declared weapon, or a weapon 
program can be translated into “chips” in a global game of 
diplomatic poker. As the case studies showed, North Korea 
has demonstrated that claiming to posses nuclear weapons, 
even without a demonstration, is enough to garner increases 
in aid from major world powers. This aid then assists 
regime maintenance by reducing some of the pressures to 
produce basic necessities for its people. It also assists 
the regime by providing it with opportunities to host 
conferences and to receive delegations from more important 
or powerful nations. In short, the weapons serve to garner 
attention from the global community that might not 
otherwise be forthcoming. 
 90 As an example of how sensitive the monitoring instruments are, 
they detected the explosion that sank the Russian SSGN Kursk as shock 
waves transmitted into the sea floor. 
91 This was the same problem that the South Africans faced with 
their first generation of nuclear warheads. 
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The second political reason to produce nuclear weapons 
is entirely internal. According to Dr. Nasser Hadian of the 
Tehran University the decision making process in Iran is 
“complex” and can seem “chaotic” to outsiders. However, he 
makes the express point that decisions are made by 
consensus, even if they take longer to come to.92 There are 
multiple groups that jockey with each other to form 
temporary alliances that must be considered. This viewpoint 
is echoed within the Iranian media. For every decision to 
be made, there are several groups with the power to do so. 
To paraphrase an Iranian academic, “There are 10 groups 
that are supposed to be in charge of fixing the horrific 
traffic in Tehran.”93 Likewise, as Ken Pollack relates in 
his book “Persian Puzzle”, Iran’s foreign policy is often 
subject to competing power groups. While President Clinton 
was trying to accept then Iranian President Khatami’s offer 
for a dialogue of civilizations, other elements within Iran 
worked to make it impossible for the two countries to come 
together.94  
These competing power centers also make it very 
difficult for the outside world to understand what exactly 
is going on inside Iran. Each power center has its own 
access to organs of the state and is capable of influencing 
 
92 Nasser Hadian, Iran's Emerging Security Environment and Relations 
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Towse'EhFebruary 20, 2004. 
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governmental decisions.95 The conflicting messages that are 
sent make it hard for anyone to understand what Iran’s real 
intentions would be in the event that they achieve a full 
nuclear fuel cycle. To add to the confusion and concern, 
Iranian President Ahmadinejad stated that his country would 
be willing to share “peaceful” nuclear technology with 
other nations in the Middle East in comments made after a 
meeting at the United Nations.96
Dr. Hadian describes the existence of five groups 
within Iran that are competing to dictate Tehran’s policy 
on the nuclear issue.97 The first believes that neither 
nuclear weapons nor nuclear power have any relevance for 
Iran. This group, lead by a Deputy Speaker of the Majiles, 
Behzad Nabavi, believes that for both environmental and 
economic reasons Iran should desist from nuclear research 
in favor of further development of fossil fuel sources for 
energy generation. The second group believes that Iran 
should be granted the rights that are spelled out in the 
NPT. This large group consists of students, university 
faculty, and policy elites. The third group believes that 
Iran should develop nuclear power, but should stop short of 
developing either nuclear weapons, or the capability to do 
so. A fourth group goes a step farther and advocates full 
 95 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict between Iran and 
America. As example of how this process works, the continuation of the 
Fatwa against author Salman Rushdie is instructive. In his book Pollack 
recounts several occasions when religious leaders or hard line 
politicians re-emphasized the Rushdie Fatwa in order to stall warming 
relations with other countries. 
96 "Majles Members Say Iran Will Halt Nuclear Protocol if Political 
Pressure Persists," Tehran Mehr News Agency (Internet Version)September 
5, 2005. 
97 Nasser Hadian, Iran's Emerging Security Environment and Relations 
with the United States: Dynamics and Prospects, 7. 
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latent capability.98 In this, Iran would seek to emulate 
Sweden and Japan. Both are countries with every capability 
that nuclear armed states posses, but no nuclear weapons. 
The final group believes that Iran should follow North 
Korea’s lead, withdraw from the NPT and produce nuclear 
weapons as soon as possible. The second and third groups 
are believed to represent the majority of Iranians.99
The existence of five competing power groups within 
Iran, a new President, and Iranian intentions to share its 
knowledge with its neighbors all indicate a powerful 
domestic element in Tehran’s proliferation case. The new 
president, no matter what his personal beliefs might be, is 
constrained by the simple fact that an overwhelming 
majority of his countrymen support the nuclear program. 
This support is not only for nuclear energy, but the full 
spectrum of nuclear technology including enrichment. Iran’s 
legislature, the Majles, has gone so far as to say that 
continued pressure on Iran to force it to give up key parts 
of its program will result in Majles actions to block 
ratification of additional IAEA protocols.100
The recent addition of an Iranian offer to share its 
nuclear technology with its neighbors reflects both a 
domestic angle as well as the more obvious international 
slant. While on the surface it may appear that Iran is 
merely trying to tempt its neighbors to exchange support of 
Iran’s diplomatic stand for eventual aid in developing 
 98 A full latent capability means possession of a complete fuel 
cycle. Mining, processing, enriching, and reprocessesing are the 
components of the full fuel cycle.  
99 Nasser Hadian, Iran's Emerging Security Environment and Relations 
with the United States: Dynamics and Prospects, 8. 
100 Majles Members Say Iran Will Halt Nuclear Protocol if Political 
Pressure Persists," Tehran Mehr News Agency. 
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Iran appears to have                    
their own nuclear industries, there is a deeper political 
angle. In his reference to “Islamic countries in need” 
during the speech in which he announced Iran’s intentions 
to transfer “know-how”, Iran’s President was clearly 
playing not only to Pan-Islamism, but also to his 
constituency in Iran, the religiously devoted but 
impoverished lower class.101  
 
E. FACTORS INFLUENCING PROLIFERATION IN IRAN: CONCLUSION 
Iran has factors present from each of the four 
identified risk categories for proliferation. In security 
issues the Iranian regime feels threatened by the presence 
of American forces so close to its borders, and also feels 
its economic security could be threatened by continued 
denial of access to nuclear technology. The recent failure 
of the NPT review conference in New York and the continued 
presence of nuclear weapons in the world’s arsenals, with 
no plans for reduction (and indeed, plans for new weapon 
designs) have all served to weaken the normative barriers 
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Iran. Furthermore, 
the United States has perhaps been its own worst enemy by 
graphically displaying its conventional power in countries 
that lacked nuclear weapons, while attempting to bargain 
with North Korea. As the third member of the Axis of Evil, 
Iran would no doubt like to receive a diplomatic solution 
much as has been offered to North Korea instead of the 
invasion force sent to Iraq.  
On the technological level, Iran possesses many of the 
facilities needed to proliferate. Even more troublesome, 
 internalized the technology needed to  
101“Iran to ‘share’ nuclear technology with Islamic countries”, 
Telegraph (Internet version), September 15, 2005. 
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produce nuclear equipment domestically. This means that in 
comparison to Libya, merely cutting off further technology 
transfers will probably not be enough to shut down the 
Iranian program. Likewise, air strikes that destroy the 
facilities themselves probably won’t be able to target the 
scientists in whom the knowledge lies to rebuild the 
facilities.  
Politically Iran is conflicted about what sort of 
program it ought to have. It seems clear that the majority 
of the political players in Iran do not favor either 
withdrawing from the NPT, or forgoing nuclear technology 
entirely. However, the Iranian President cannot ignore the 
fact that the Majles is very opposed to the idea of 
additional concessions to the European Three in return for 
recognition of their program. Finally, there are 
opportunities for Ahmadinejad to translate a tough stand on 
the nuclear issue into greater support for his domestic 
economic reforms. As his statements about sharing the 
technology reflect, he is also seeking to bolster his image 
as an Islamist as well as an Iranian, which is important to 
the Sunni and non-Persian minorities living within Iran. 
As the Iran case study indicates, all of the axes of 
multi-causality are active in Iran. The security element 
appears once again to be the first consideration of the 
Iranian decision makers. However, in the case of Iran, the 
strength of the technological and domestic arguments adds 
up to a picture which is not necessarily one of a nation 
bent on achieving nuclear weapons. While the security 
aspects of Iran’s program are largely related to Iran’s 
confrontation with the United States, the previous case 
studies have shown that such a confrontation need not end 
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in the construction of a nuclear weapon. Indeed, the 
economic security, domestic arguments, and technological 
elements all point to an Iran which wants nuclear 
technology for all of the right reasons. When the 
statements of the Majles are considered, as well as the 
Iranian reaction to rumors of American intervention, the 
real threat of nuclear weapon proliferation in Iran seems 
to be actions taken by other nations that push Tehran to 
build a bomb. 
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V. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS:  
BREAKING THE GRAVEYARD SPIRAL 
In the world of aviation there is a phenomenon known 
as the “Graveyard Spiral”, in which an aircraft enters a 
descending spiral without the pilot’s realization. If the 
pilot incorrectly diagnoses the situation he/she will only 
notice the decreasing altitude, and not the aircraft’s 
angle of bank. This then leads to an incorrect attempt to 
halt the loss of altitude by pulling back on the control 
stick. This action only serves to tighten the spiral and 
increase the rate of altitude loss. The “Graveyard Spiral” 
condition is analogous to the state of affairs between the 
United States and Iran. America looks at Iran and sees 
things it doesn’t like. Unfortunately, the inputs we have 
made to fix the problem are only going to make it worse. 
This is because American policy makers have not accurately 
categorized the motivating factors behind Iranian policy. 
In the previous chapter the factors that motivate Iranian 
policy were split into four categories: Security, internal 
politics, technology and norms. For each of these 
categories there is an appropriate American policy response 
that could affect positive change to Iranian policy and 
benefit the U.S. 
 
A. THE SECURITY DILEMMA 
In the previous chapter the reasons for Iran to feel 
the need for additional security were laid out. Iran feels 
surrounded and threatened by the United States as a result 
of long term conflicts between the two nations as well as 
the consequences of the Global War on Terror. Because of 
historical experience Iran also feels that it can not 
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guarantee its own security without a large measure of 
independence from the rest of the world.102 Finally, Iran’s 
attempts to guarantee its security have been influenced by 
the recent examples of Iraq and North Korea.  
The United States has the ability to positively affect 
Iran’s policy by altering Tehran’s perception of its 
security problems. This opportunity is largely the result 
of the fact that the United States is the only country that 
Iran feels truly threatened by.103 While the perception of 
threat gives the US the opportunity to affect positive 
change in Iran, it should not be seen as leverage. The 
ability of the regime in Tehran to rally domestic support 
for their nuclear research program through the use of 
nationalist slogans is clear evidence that perceptions of 
US threat to Iran do not translate into leverage. 
Demonstrations by otherwise pro-reform Iranian students 
after Iran’s decision to halt nuclear activities in Esfahan 
and Natanz further demonstrate the ability of disparate and 
competing power structures in Iran to rally in the face of 
perceived interference by foreign powers.104 Likewise, the 




 102 This is due to the fact that Iran was completely cut off from 
the world arms market following the 1979 revolution. The experience of 
fighting the Iran-Iraq war on its own while Iraq received Western aid 
and arms was deeply scarring and is reflected in everyday government 
statements. One obvious example is the constant reference to the needs 
for self sufficiency in Iran’s planned nuclear power network. 
103 Benham Qolipur, "An Inquiry into the Issue of National Security 
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104 "Iranian Students Hold Pro-Nuclear Rallies Outside French, 
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discredit opposition politicians has been to link those 
individuals and their political parties to supposed CIA 
money.105
The easiest way for the United States to affect 
positive change to Iran’s perception of security is 
deceptively simple: Open a dialogue with Iran. One of the 
largest impediments to Iranian-American rapprochement is 
the simple fact that the two countries have no official 
relations with each other.106 Excepting back channel 
negotiations for hostages in Lebanon and coordination for 
operations against the Taliban, the United States has 
treated Iran much the same way as it treats Cuba: it 
ignores it with the hope that one day it will go away and 
be replaced by a more acceptable regime. 
The Shakespearean tragedy of the Iranian-American 
story is that the two countries could coordinate on a wide 
range of issues that are of interest to both. In the realm 
of security, Iran is just as concerned about the spread of 
militant Salafi Islam as the United States. With a Shi’a 
population scattered throughout the Sunni dominated Gulf 
States, Iran is rightly concerned with the spread of an 
ideology that sees them as apostates. Evidence of just how 
concerned Iran is with the spread of Sunni extremism can be 
found in the lengths to which Iran went to work with the 
“Great Satan” during the Operation Enduring Freedom 
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strategic implications of a nuclear-armed Iran. 64, : 79, pp VII. This 
point was also made by Senator Biden in the Senate Committee on Foreign 
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campaign in Afghanistan.107 Iran and America also share 
concerns about the heroin trade in Afghanistan. America is 
concerned because the drug money has distorting effects on 
the fabric of Afghan society, while Iran is concerned 
because those drugs run straight into Iran and fuel the 
explosive growth of drug use.108
If contact between the two countries could be useful 
in helping combat mutual enemies of the two countries it 
could be even more useful in reassuring each other that the 
other side is a rational actor. American contacts with the 
Soviet Union were kept up throughout the Cold War, and 
certainly proved useful in defusing tensions between the 
two super powers.109 Likewise, America kept up relations 
with Communist China even during periods of tensions 
between the two such as the recurring Taiwan issue and the 
Tiananmen Square massacre.  
 
B. UNDERSTANDING IRAN’S INTERNAL POLITICS 
America’s current policy towards Iran as it relates to 
domestic politics is another example of the wrong input. 
How can America expect Iran to take criticism about its 
electoral process when unelected monarchies such as Saudi 
Arabia are given such lavish attention? It is true that 
Iran’s elected government sits under an unelected 
theocracy, however, what the US often doesn’t consider is 
 
107 Pollack, The Persian Puzzle : The Conflict between Iran and 
America, 345. 
108 U.N. Office for the Coordination of Human Affairs, "Bitter Sweet 
Harvest: Afghanistan's New War," United Nations, 
http://www.irinnews.org/webspecials/Opium/regIrn.asp (accessed August 
20, 2005). 
109 Anthony Cordesman, Iranian Security Threat and the US Policy: 
Finding the Proper Response (Washington D.C.: Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations,[2003]). 
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how this compares to many other countries with which 
America maintains relations. Throughout Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia, American embassies and military to military 
relationships exist in countries lacking democratic 
elections, political parties, and basic freedoms such as 
universal suffrage.110 Underneath the admittedly un-elected 
layer of mullahs and Pasdaran officers lies an active 
multi-party system that has regular elections. These 
elections are not always held in ideal conditions, and 
there have been reports of illiberal practices during the 
elections. What American policy doesn’t take into account 
is how hollow it sounds to condemn Iranian elections as un-
democratic after a President there is elected with a seven 
million vote lead while the Saudis are applauded for 
allowing limited elections in which only men were allowed 
to vote.111
The solution for American foreign policy as it relates 
to Iran in the matters of internal politics is to take 
actions to remove any taint of American “meddling” in Iran. 
A quick review of Iranian history will show why the mere 
hint of CIA funds in a politician’s war chest is enough to 
campaign. The United Kingdom, Russia,  110 As per the 2005 Freedom House report US allies in the GWoT that 
ranked at Iran’s level or lower include: Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and 
Azerbaijan. The full report is available at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/index.htm#reports. 
111 "Joint Statement by President Bush and Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah," Office of the Press Secretary, 
www.whitehouse.gove/news/releases/2005/04/20050425-8.html (accessed 
September 14, 2005).. In this article Bush congratulated the Saudi 
leader for the elections held in the desert kingdom. On the other side 
of the coin, President Bush said of Iran “Power is in the hands of an 
unelected few who have retained power through an electoral process that 
ignores the basic requirements of democracy”. "Bush Criticizes Iran's 
Election," British Broadcasting Corporation, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4100476.stm (accessed September 
14, 2005). 
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and America have all interfered in Iranian governance at 
one time or another for what are successfully portrayed in 
Iran as self serving reasons. While few Americans may know 
anything about the boycott of the British tobacco 
concession, or the CIA sponsored overthrow of Prime 
Minister Mossadegh, most Iranian’s know all about it.112 In 
fairness, they know the angle they have been told by their 
government and its media interests, but perceptions matter. 
These perceptions mean that Iranians, no matter whether 
they are left wing, hard-line conservatives, or moderates 
have a reflexive reaction to anything with the taint of 
foreign influence.113 This means that no matter what the 
intent of the US Congress when it authorized three million 
dollars for “opposition support” in Iran, the result is a 
negative response from all segments of Iranian society.114
Another change for American foreign policy is more of 
a change in mindset. When America looks at Iran it sees 
revolutionary Islam and images of the American Embassy 
hostage crisis.115 When Iran looks at the US, and the 
Iranian opposition funded TV stations beaming content to 
satellite dishes across their country, they see government 
influence. America shouldn’t be surprised when the Iranian 
government accuses it of directly funding these opposition 
 112 The American sponsored overthrow of Mossadegh is commonly cited 
in Friday Sermons and domestic political dialog in Iran. Of note, 
England’s role in the event is rarely mentioned. 
113 Shahram Chubin and Robert S. Litwak, "Debating Iran's Nuclear 
Aspirations," The Washington Quarterly 26, no. 4 (Autumn, 2003), 46. 
114 Hon. William Luers, Statement by William H. Luers (Washington 
D.C.: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,[2003]). “The number one 
block in Iran to dialogue is their feeling that we only want regime 
change.” 
115 This instinct was reflected in the accusations that the newly 
elected hard line President of Iran was one the Embassy hostage takers, 
a claim later refuted by the CIA. 
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groups. US policy makers also need to be better informed on 
how this perception in Iran shapes the way in which 
opinions are formed there. If you are the Iranian 
government, and you believe that American money funds the 
opposition groups, while the U.S. Congress appropriates 
money earmarked specifically to promote regime change in 
Iran, it becomes easier to imagine why Iran assumes that 
the US is out to get it.116
 
C. TECHNOLOGY: WHY THE GENIE WON’T GO BACK INTO THE 
BOTTLE 
During the recent meltdown in the dialogue between the 
European Troika and Iran over Iran’s nuclear program one 
theme has been repeated over and over in the Iranian press: 
Why doesn’t Iran get to have the benefit of its membership 
in the NPT? While this question also delves into the issue 
of norms, the discussion should also look at the related 
technology. At its heart, nuclear science isn’t cutting 
edge. The theories behind the industry of nuclear power are 
well developed and widely distributed. Countries on every 
continent have mastered the related scientific fields and 
produced everything from power plants to bombs. As the 
unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network has shown, even if you 
lack the internal technological capability to produce 
nuclear technology, someone will find a way to supply you 
as long as you are willing to pay the black market price. 
In the case of Iran, unlike Libya, not only was 
technology purchased, but it was internalized. Instead of 
only buying centrifuges, Iran learned how to produce them 
 
116 Sonni Efron and Mark Mazzetti, "The World; U.S. may Aid Iran 
Activists; Officials at State have Money in Hand but are Still Weighing 
how to Best Effect Change." Los Angeles Times, Mar 4, 2005. 
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as well.117 This means that attempts by the United States 
through arrangements like the Proliferation Security 
Initiative are trying to close the barn door long after the 
horse left. If it is nearly impossible to prevent the 
spread of older nuclear technology, there is also an issue 
of safety. Through US pressure, European firms with 
excellent safety records have been prevented from 
completing Bushehr, which was originally designed by 
Siemens. Instead, Russian firms with questionable safety 
records have attempted to shoehorn their own reactor design 
into the pre-existing foundations built for the German 
reactor. This has been further compounded by the inclusion 
of homemade Iranian parts. The safety implications for such 
an arrangement are clear.118
Considering that the technology that underlies nuclear 
weapons is the same that underlies nuclear power it is not 
difficult to see what the American foreign policy concern 
might be over Iran’s acquisition of said technologies. 
However, the current policy does nothing to stop the 
continuing development of Iranian nuclear technology, while 
serving as a continuing irritant to the volatile student 
movement in Iran.119 As was previously discussed, there are 
very real economic benefits to the production of 
electricity through nuclear power not to mention potential 
environmental benefits. Iran already has the technology it 
 
117 David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, The Centrifuge Connection. 
118 Katzman, Iran: US Policy Concerns and Responses, 36. 
119 Amin Modher, "Iran Asserts Security of British Embassy," 
Washington Times, http://www.washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20040603-
080851-5006r.htm (accessed September 16, 2005). In recent weeks, the 
Embassies of Germany France and Great Britain have been subjected to 
numerous street demonstrations from Iranian student organizations. 
Meanwhile a group of college students have formed a “human chain” 
around the nuclear facilities at Esfahan. 
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needs to develop its nuclear industry, and there is 
virtually nothing America can do to turn back that clock.120 
Continued opposition to Iran’s nuclear technology programs 
gains nothing, while providing a vast amount of political 
ammunition for Iran’s hardliners. 
 
D. DO AS I SAY…THE NORMATIVE DEBATE 
So far the discussion about how to affect a positive 
change on Iranian policy has focused on American foreign 
policy. The normative debate adds a domestic element to the 
American side of the equation. This is to say that what 
America does internally also has an impact on what Iran may 
or may not choose to do with the technology it already 
possesses. Norms are a shared set of values that can change 
over time.121 In the realm of nuclear technology these norms 
are affected by external relations between countries and 
the internal policies of the major states. Early in their 
life, nuclear weapons were considered a standard part of 
any well equipped army. Nuclear land mines, artillery 
shells, depth charges and even mortar rounds where 
 
120 Geoffrey Kemp, Iran's Bomb and what to do about it, ed. Geoffrey 
Kemp (Washington D.C.: Nixon Center, 2004). Kemp states that “even if 
the United States were able to conduct effective strikes against those 
installations that we know about it would be unlikely to do more than 
delay the Iranian nuclear program. Meanwhile in his testimony to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 28th, 2003, Anthony 
Cordesman stated that such strikes would most likely encourage more 
rapid development of nuclear technology. 
121 International Communication and Negotiation Simulations Center 
for International Development and Conflict Management, "Research 
Library: Glossary of Scenario Terms," University of Maryland, 
http://www.icons.umd.edu/pls/reslib/display_glossary#I (accessed 
September 3, 2005).Defines norms as “ideals, values and practices held 
in common by a majority of states in the international system. If 
enough states recognize a specific norm and consistently use it in 
their relations with other states, that norm will likely become part of 
international law.” 
62
                    
commonplace.122 Not surprisingly during this period nuclear 
power was considered the wave of the future, and everyone 
was planning on taking advantage of it.123 This is the 
period of the Atoms for Peace program which was supposed to 
usher in an age of clean and plentiful energy. Over time 
the perception of nuclear weapons changed as the weapons 
themselves became more capable and more numerous. The 
evolution of the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy 
finally opened the public’s eyes to the enormous potential 
for destruction while accidents like Three Mile Island in 
the United States simultaneously changed the domestic 
perception of nuclear energy.124
Only two nuclear weapons have ever been used as a part 
of combat operations. After an early start as weapons of 
battlefield utility, nuclear devices quickly became 
strategic weapons. This has had two effects: The first is 
that no one arms their troops with nuclear mortars anymore, 
and the second is that the nuclear weapon has become the 
ultimate guarantor of national survival. In Israel’s case 
this guarantee is necessary due to the extreme lack of 
strategic depth. For a state geographically so exposed to 
multiple potential enemies the possession of nuclear 
weapons allows the creation of artificial depth. This is 
 
122 Wikipedia, "Nuclear Weapons: Delivery Systems," 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapon#Other_delivery_systems 
(accessed August 20, 2005). 
123 Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light : American Thought and 
Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1994), 109. 
124 World Nuclear Association, "Three Mile Island: 1979," 
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf36.htm (accessed August 16, 
2005).The accident at Three Mile Island and the public perception of a 
massive tragedy narrowly averted directly lead to a decline in the 
public’s perception of nuclear energy. This also directly influenced 
the sharp decline in nuclear construction following the incident. 
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possible due to the fact that the capitals of those enemies 
are all within range of Israeli air power. Moreover, 
throughout its history, Israel has repeatedly demonstrated 
the ability to enter its enemy’s most sensitive air space. 
Likewise, Iran fears that its place on the “Axis of Evil” 
has marked it for harsh treatment by the United States. 
Iranian policy makers seeking to understand what their 
label means might look at the other two members of the 
axis. One state was assessed by American intelligence to 
have enough material to construct a few nuclear weapons, 
while the other had once tried, but was assumed to be 
currently lacking the ability to repeat the attempt. Their 
dissimilar fates would have been instructive. 
The recently renewed interest in nuclear weapons 
within the American administration has further weakened the 
norms against nuclear proliferation. As has been previously 
discussed, one need not look further than the US budget to 
see almost a half billion dollars earmarked for research on 
a nuclear bunker buster. This represents a reversal of 
decades of transition away from the idea of nuclear weapons 
being at all useful in general combat. The unspoken 
statement is that if a nuclear device is designed to have 
manageable or even negligible side effects, it will find 
use again on the battlefield. 
In order to assuage Iranian concerns about the utility 
of nuclear weapons, and therefore gain some bargaining 
leverage in the discussion of their efforts to develop a 
nuclear industry the US would need to make some major 
changes in its strategic nuclear policy. As has been 
mentioned, Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty specifically calls on the nuclear states to work 
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towards the eventual destruction of all nuclear weapons. 
While impressive steps on this were made following the end 
of the Cold War, recent statements about the need to 
restart nuclear tests in order to guarantee the reliability 
of the American stockpile as well as the Robust Nuclear 
Earth Penetrator discussion have completely ignored the 
Article VI requirements.125
Another hot button issue relates to the three nuclear 
powers who are not signatories of the NPT. Pakistan and 
India are declared nuclear powers while Israel maintains a 
thin layer of doubt about the existence of its arsenal. 
While Iran is being pressured to give up its rights under 
NPT, India Pakistan, and Israel all have relations with the 
United States that include military exchanges. The last 
presidential campaign in America is illustrative of the 
lack of interest for serious change in nuclear policy in 
America. Despite the fear of nuclear weapons falling into 
the hands of terrorists, the debates between President Bush 
and Senator Kerry never focused on nuclear policy. 
Furthermore, nuclear policy was not among those issues that 
the voters worry about.126 As long as nuclear weapons remain 
out of the public’s spotlight, there is little chance that 
political leaders will take the time to debate their 
continued presence in the American arsenal. Nevertheless, 
for those crafting America’s foreign policy it is important 
 125 Refer to footnote 79 for the exact wording of Article VI. In 
2002 America and Russia negotiated SORT. This treaty limits the two 
nations to no more than 2200 operationally deployed warheads in their 
arsenals. 
126 Mark D. Camillo and Marvin Fields, "California Voters Continue 
to Hold Negative Views on Bush's Job Performance and the Direction of 
the Country," Field Research Corporation, 
http://field.com/fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2135.pdf (accessed 
September 1, 2005). Terrorism, the war in Iraq, and the economy were 
the top three issues for California’s voters.  
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to fully understand how this reality plays in Iran. It is 
ironic that both American and Iranian officials can 
legitimately claim that domestic politics make it very 
difficult to accommodate the other on this matter. No 
American official can seriously attempt to pressure Israel 
to become a signatory to the NPT, whereas demonstrations 
against Iranian chief negotiator Hassan Rowhani calling him 
a traitor for agreeing to freeze activities at Esfahan and 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
This thesis set out to accomplish three tasks: Use a 
series of case studies to validate or modify multi-
causality as a method to describe proliferation decisions, 
to apply this theory to Iran, and to discuss policy options 
for the United States in light of the first two sections. 
The reasons why the United States should take a fresh look 
at its policy towards the Islamic Republic were also 
stated: Iran sits on top of one of the world’s main oil 
reserves, it sits astride the geological nexus of the world 
oil economy, and it also has the potential for dramatic 
impact on the two main US efforts in the Global War on 
Terror currently underway. 
The attempt to curb nuclear proliferation has a close 
parallel in the ongoing “War on Drugs”. In both efforts, 
the international community is trying to restrict the trade 
in certain illicit materials. Because the demand for these 
goods is so high, potential suppliers can make a large 
profit through successful deliveries. As long as the demand 
keeps the price high, someone will find a way to supply the 
illegal material. By this reasoning, unless the 
international community can curb demand for nuclear 
weapons, their suppliers will always find a way.128 American 
policy should therefore concern itself more with forging 
security ties in order to reduce the “demand” than with 
policies like the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
America need not be the guarantor of security for everyone; 
in fact, we have a vested interest in involving the other 
is project. The basic problem is that  
128 Paul and others, Power Versus Prudence : Why Nations Forgo 
Nuclear Weapons, 152. 
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in the age of American conventional supremacy, nations that 
have cause to distrust Washington’s intentions have only 
nuclear weapons to turn to. The more Washington flaunts its 
power, while renovating its nuclear stockpile, the greater 
demand will be elsewhere in the world for nuclear 
technology. Unfortunately, there appears to be little 
chance that the “original five” will fulfill their Article 
VI obligations anytime soon. The only other alternative is 
to arrange for nations that request it, an extension of the 
nuclear umbrella from one of the established nuclear 
powers. 
This line of thought directly intersects with the 
debate between Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz in the book 
“The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed“.129 Most 
of Sagan’s concerns for instability in new nuclear states 
would be taken care of if the nuclear deterrent was 
supplied by an established nuclear power. This would give 
all the benefits of deterrence with none of the drawbacks. 
Also, since the established nuclear powers have fully 
developed nuclear deterrence forces and survivable counter 
strike arsenals, there could be no temptation by a smaller 
nuclear power of achieving a surprise strike. By this 
argument, with a worldwide umbrella in place, states would 
not feel the need to achieve nuclear weapons status. Of 
course, a major issue with this idea would end up being 
whether or not the protected states actually believed in 
the promises of their protector. This concern can be 
answered by the examples of Germany, Sweden and Japan. As 
was reviewed, their motivation in choosing not to develop 
 
129 Scott Douglas Sagan and Kenneth Neal Waltz, The Spread of 
Nuclear Weapons : A Debate Renewed : With New Sections on India and 
Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defense (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2003), 220. 
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nuclear weapons has been directly tied to the belief that 
they lived under an American nuclear umbrella. Even though 
it is difficult to see which state Iran might choose to 
rely on for such a guarantee, their close cooperation with 
China might present an opening.  
Nations choose to develop nuclear programs for a 
variety of reasons. Depending on the location of the nation 
in question, and the time period in which the program was 
begun, the reasons for attempting to proliferate fall into 
four categories: security, technology, domestic concerns, 
and norms. It is important to note that in no state is 
there only one category active. Each nuclear program is 
influenced by all four categories; the degree of influence 
is the variable. History also points to the primacy of 
security needs. Of all the nations that pursued nuclear 
programs only in India were security concerns not 
demonstrably the root cause. 
In the case of Iran, security concerns are also the 
dominant factor in their decision to pursue nuclear 
technology. Security in this instance is not only physical 
security, but is also economic security as well. As a major 
oil exporter, reliant like so many of its neighbors on the 
sale of natural resources to keep its government 
operational, Iran has enormous incentives to develop a 
power source that saves oil. As demonstrated, using nuclear 
power will be immensely profitable for Iran. Adding to 
Iran’s reasons for pursuing nuclear technology are domestic 
pressures, technological ability and norms. Iran’s domestic 
audience is largely in favor of pursuing all aspects of 
peaceful nuclear technology. As was previously discussed, 
the possession of a full spectrum of peaceful nuclear 
technology is almost indistinguishable from a military 
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nuclear capability. Iran has also developed a domestic 
technological base to continue its study of nuclear 
technology. This sets it apart from other nations such as 
Libya and Indonesia that have attempted to acquire nuclear 
technology in the past. Finally the issue of norms has 
affected Iran’s calculations. The difference on how the 
international community handled fellow “Axis of Evil” 
members Iraq and North Korea was surely instructional. 
Likewise, clear intent to research a new generation of 
nuclear weapons in America has resurrected the idea of 
military utility for nuclear weapons. 
Based on this understanding, a series of policy 
recommendations for the United States were presented. These 
prescriptions for resolving tensions with Iran were based 
on the four areas that are leading Iran to proliferate. The 
intention of these recommendations is not to convince Iran 
to give up its domestic nuclear program, as the author does 
not believe that this is a realistic goal. The intention is 
to solve the series of misunderstandings between Iran and 
the United States that continue to plague their relations. 
In the end, the ideal outcome would be for Iran and the 
United States to end decades of isolation and re-establish 
diplomatic relations. In the meanwhile, these 
recommendations are designed to alleviate concerns between 
Tehran and Washington over Iran’s desire to develop a 
nuclear industry. Only through understanding the factors 
that influence Iran’s decision making can America craft a 
workable policy to insure continued security in the region. 
The United States needs to get past the events of the 
Iran Hostage Crisis and the skirmishes of the “Tanker War”, 
just as Iran needs to understand that the events of 
Mossadegh’s overthrow in 1953 are distant memory for most 
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Americans, if remembered at all. Iran represents a country 
struggling to find answers to the same questions American 
foreign policy is attempting to answer. What does an 
Islamic government look like? How does Islamic 
fundamentalism coexist with the modern world? How should 
the countries of the Middle East come to terms with the 
facts of their creation and govern their populations in an 
equitable manner? Obviously Iran has not yet discovered the 
optimal answer, but the fact that the people of Iran 
regularly vote on the issue through national elections is a 
good start. It makes no sense that American should continue 
to have close relations with the un-elected monarchy of 
Saudi Arabia while it refuses to even extend basic 
diplomatic recognition to Iran. The refusal to accept the 
outcome of the Iranian Revolution, and the attendant 
hostility in American policy towards the elected government 
of Iran is the biggest threat to the broader American goals 
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